Frenemies: How do financial firms vote on their own kind?
2016, Management Science (A. Keswani, D. Stolin, and A. Tran)
- Financial firms’ governance is weakened by the support they get from their peers.
- Discussed in Citywire, Financial Times, Le Monde, Ignites Europe
Voting against absent directors
2016, Economics Bulletin (S. Bourjade, C. Pungulescu, and D. Stolin)
- Puzzling investor reaction to information about director attendance of board meetings.
Corporate monitoring and voting disclosure choices:
A study of UK asset managers
2015, Corporate Ownership and Control (B. Kogan and G. Salganik-Shoshan)
- Full-disclosure asset managers are leaders in stewardship, and the rationales they give for their voting have an impact.
- Discussed in ShareAction.org
Corporate governments:
Government connections of public oil and gas companies
2015, Corporate Governance and Control (B. Kogan and G. Salganik-Shoshan)
- Energy companies from more corrupt countries have more government connections through their boards – and having more former government officials on the board helps profitability.